

## Message Text

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ACTION SCI-06

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 EA-11 IO-12 ADP-00 ACDA-19 AEC-11 AF-10

ARA-11 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-09 H-02 INR-10 L-03 NASA-04

NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-10 OIC-04 PA-03 PRS-01 RSC-01

GAC-01 SS-15 MBFR-03 USIA-12 SAJ-01 RSR-01 /196 W  
----- 055914

P R 141539 Z MAY 73

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5025

INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AEC GERMANTOWN

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 06882

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, IAEA, JA, GW

SUBJECT: US/ IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT AND NPT  
RATIFICATION

REF: A. STATE 90648; B. BONN 6692; C. IAEA VIENNA 3884;  
D. BONN 6819

SUMMARY: GIVEN STATE SECRETARY FRANK' S MAY 10 FOLLOW UP  
PITCH WITH THE AMBASSADOR ON US VOLUNTARY OFFER, POINTS  
IN DEPT' S GUIDANCE WERE MADE BY EMBOFF TO FONOFF ATOMIC  
ENERGY DEPT CHIEF RANDERMANN. GERMAN REACTION WAS ONE  
OF SERIOUS CONCERN. END SUMMARY.

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1. US/ IAEA NEGOTIATIONS. RANDERMANN WELCOMED US STATEMENT OF INTENT TO PROCEED AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS.

2. US/ FRG CONSULTATIONS. RANDERMANN NOTED THAT US HAD NOT GIVEN INDICATION AS TO WHEN SUCH US/ FRG CONSULTATIONS MIGHT OCCUR. WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT SUCH CONSULTATIONS COULD BE USEFUL COSMETICALLY VIS- A- VIS THE BUNDESTAG, HE STRESSED THAT THE MAIN PURPOSE WOULD BE TO HAVE A SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION BETWEEN GERMAN AND AMERICAN OFFICIALS AT AN EARLY POINT IN ORDER TO AFFORD TIME FOR FOLLOW UP DISCUSSIONS SHOULD THERE BE LESS THAN A FULL HARMONY OF VIEWS. WHILE WELCOMING INFORMATION OBTAINED IN VIENNA, THE GERMANS DESIRED SUBSTANTIVE EXCHANGES OF VIEWS RATHER THAN SIMPLY BEING INFORMED, AND THAT SUCH EXCHANGES COULD TAKE PLACE MORE CONSTRUCTIVELY IN WASHINGTON THAN IN VIENNA, BOTH ON THE POLITICAL AND THE LEGAL ISSUES.

3. LINKAGE TO JAPAN. RANDERMANN NOTED THAT, UNLIKE THE BRITISH STATEMENT, PRESIDENT JOHNSON' S STATEMENT OF OFFER DID NOT REFER TO JAPAN AND ADDED THAT THE US VOLUNTARY OFFER WAS AND REMAINED AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE GERMAN DECISION TO SIGN THE NPT. RANDERMANN CONTINUED THAT LINKAGE OF US IMPLEMENTATION TO JAPANESE RATIFICATION COULD PUT THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT " IN TROUBLE" WITH THE BUNDESTAG DURING THE NPT RATIFICATION DEBATE. WHILE CONFIRMING THAT THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT IS NOT INSISTING UPON COMPLETION OF US/ IAEA NEGOTIATIONS AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO GERMAN RATIFICATION OF THE NPT AND EURATOM/ IAEA AGREEMENT, RANDERMANN SAID HE WAS " CLEARLY WORRIED" ABOUT BUNDESTAG REACTION TO LINKAGE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE US OFFER TO THE " IFFY" QUESTION OF JAPANESE RATIFICATION OF THE NPT.

4. IN REPLY, EMBOFF SUPPORTED DEPT' S POSITION BY DRAWING EXTENSIVELY FROM QUOTATIONS IN IAEA VIENNA 3884, SAYING THAT PRESIDENT' S REFERENCE TO APPLICATION UNDER

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ACTION SCI-06

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GAC-01 SS-15 MBFR-03 USIA-12 SAJ-01 RSR-01 /196 W

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P R 141539 Z MAY 73

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5026

INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AEC GERMANTOWN

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 06882

NPT OBVIOUSLY REFERRED TO ADVANCED INDUSTRIALIZED STATES SUCH AS EURATOM MEMBER STATES AND JAPAN. RANDERMANN NOTED THESE POINTS BUT SAID THAT PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT WAS CONTROLLING, HAD NOT INTRODUCED SUCH A LINKAGE WITH JAPAN, AND THAT NO GERMAN OFFICIAL HAD UNDERSTOOD THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF US OFFER MIGHT BE MORTGAGED TO SOVEREIGN DECISION OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.

5. COMMENT: GIVEN STRONG EMPHASIS WITH WHICH STATE SECRETARY FRANK MADE THESE POINTS TO THE AMBASSADOR AND THE EXPRESSION OF SERIOUS CONCERN VOICED BY RANDERMANN, IT IS IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE THE POLITICAL ( RATHER THAN PURELY TECHNICAL) CHARACTER OF THE FRG  
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DEMARCHE. SINCE THE FRG ATTITUDE TOWARD NPT OBVIOUSLY WILL BE THE KEY TO RATIFICATION BY OTHER EURATOM STATES, AND ALSO WILL SIGNIFICANTLY INFLUENCE THE RATIFICATION PROCESS IN JAPAN ( TOKYO 5417), IT WOULD SEEM TO BE IN OUR INTERESTS TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT

FRG SUBSTANTIVE AND COSMETIC CONCERNS VIS- A- VIS THE BUNDESTAG. FOR THAT REASON, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF WE COULD INDICATE THE READINESS OF DEPT OFFICIALS TO CONSULT WITH APPROPRIATE GERMAN OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON AT AN EARLY DATE. WE ARE NOT ABLE FROM BONN TO EVALUATE ALL ASPECTS OF THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE RATIFICATION PROCESSES IN EUROPE AND ASIA, BUT ON THE BASIS OF THE CITED REPORT BY EMBASSY TOKYO, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT WHILE GERMAN RATIFICATION WOULD CONTRIBUTE POSITIVELY TO THE JAPANESE RATIFICATION PROCESS, LINKING THE SLOWER JAPANESE TRAIN TO THE GERMAN RATIFICATION PROCESS COULD RAISE PROBLEMS FOR GERMANY AND THUS FOR EURATOM STATES. UNTIL THE GERMANS RAISED THE LINKAGE QUESTION LAST WEEK ( BONN 6692 AND 6819), THE WAY APPEARED CLEAR FOR GERMAN RATIFICATION BY THE END OF THIS YEAR. IT REMAINS OUR IMPRESSION THAT FRG RATIFICATION THIS YEAR WILL OCCUR IF THE US ADEQUATELY CAN REASSURE BONN ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF POSSIBLE NON- RATIFICATION BY TOKYO. TO THAT END, EARLY CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON WOULD APPEAR TO BE A GOOD WAY TO ABORT DEVELOPMENT OF A POTENTIALLY SERIOUS POLITICAL BURDEN ON THE NPT RATIFICATION PROCESS.

6. FURTHER GUIDANCE WOULD BE APPRECIATED.  
HILLENBRAND

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\*\*\* Current Handling Restrictions \*\*\* n/a  
\*\*\* Current Classification \*\*\* CONFIDENTIAL

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**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
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**TAGS:** PARM, GW, JA, IAEA  
**To:** BRUSSELS  
LONDON  
LUXEMBOURG  
PARIS  
ROME  
SCI  
SECSTATE WASHDC

THE HAGUE

TOKYO

**Type:** TE

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